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a b s t r a c t
Fear conditioning studies have shown that social anxiety is associated with enhanced expectancy of
aversive outcome. However, the relation between cognitive expectancy and social anxiety has never been
tested in avoidance conditioning paradigms. We compared 48 low (LSA) and high socially anxious
individuals (HSA) on subjective expectancy of aversive outcome during an avoidance conditioning task.
Displays of neutral faces were coupled with an aversive outcome (US): a shout and a shock. Participants
could avoid the US by pressing a correct button from a button box. First, HSA showed higher US
expectancy than LSA during the initial phase of avoidance conditioning, supporting the view that socially
anxious individuals have an expectancy bias when social situations are ambiguous. Second, when the
avoidance response became unavailable, LSA showed lower US expectancy than HSA, suggesting that low
socially anxious individuals are prone to a positive bias when perceived threat is high. A lack of such
positive bias in socially anxious individuals may lead to higher susceptibility to safety behavior inter
pretations. Together, these ﬁndings support the role of cognitive processes in avoidance conditioning and
underscore the relevance to encounter avoidance learning when studying social anxiety.
 2009 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
Introduction
Social Anxiety Disorder (SAD) is one of the most prominent
mental disorders (Bo¨gels & Tarrier, 2004). It is the most frequent
anxiety disorder and the third most common mental disorder in
the population (Kessler et al., 1994). SAD is characterized by fear
and avoidance of social interaction and evaluation (Hofmann &
Bo¨gels, 2006).
Cognitive mechanisms may play an important role in the
development and the maintenance of social anxiety (e.g., Clark &
Wells, 1995; Rapee & Heimberg, 1997). There is substantial
evidence for the presence of information processing biases in social
anxious individuals. For instance, heightened self focused atten
tion, selective retrieval of negative past social events and biased
interpretation of social events in a negative way have been
observed in SAD (for a review, see Hirsch & Clark, 2004). These
cognitive biases may lead to overestimations of social threat in
social situations and to behavioral processes in the form of overt
avoidance and safety behaviors (Clark & Wells, 1995). As a negative
consequence, these dysfunctional behaviors may make a feared
outcome more likely to occur. For example, a social phobic who
hardly speaks in social situations may receive less positive feedback
from others. In addition, avoidance of social situations decreases
the opportunity to disconﬁrm negative beliefs (Salkovskis, 1991).
Phobics tend to attribute the nonoccurrence of an expected aver
sive outcome to their safety behaviors. Avoidance and safety
behaviors not only prevent the person from potential achievement,
but also disallow progression in anxiety reduction: it prevents
exposure to feared situations and, hence, prohibits extinction of the
phobic fear. For these reasons, avoidance and safety behaviors are
considered a major maintaining factor of anxiety (Barlow, 2002;
Clark & Wells, 1995; Salkovskis, 1991).
Despite the crucial role of avoidance behavior, research in the
ﬁeld of social anxiety has been mainly focused on fear learning and
not on avoidance learning. In this study, we used an avoidance
learning paradigm to compare avoidance conditioning in high
(HSA) and low socially anxious (LSA) participants. The main
purpose was to test whether HSAwould show higher expectancy of
aversive outcome during avoidance conditioning. In addition, we
tested whether HSA would show prolonged aversive outcome
expectancy even in the absence of aversive outcome during an
extinction like procedure.
Several studies, using fear conditioning and extinction para
digms, have found higher levels of conditioned responding during
acquisition and delayed extinction of conditioned fear among
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anxious patients in contrast with healthy controls (e.g., Grillon &
Morgan, 1999; Orr et al., 2000; Pitman & Orr, 1986). A few of these
studies concerned fear conditioning in social phobics (Hermann,
Ziegler, Birbaumer, & Flor, 2002; Schneider et al., 1999; Veit et al.,
2002). For example, using a differential aversive Pavlovian condi
tioning paradigm, Hermann et al. (2002) found that social phobics
had an overall higher subjective arousal, enhanced unconditioned
stimulus (US) expectancy during acquisition, especially for the
nonreinforced conditioned stimuli (CS ), and a delayed extinction
of conditioned skin conductance response. These results are
consistent with cognitive theories suggesting that cognitive biases
play a role in the development and maintenance of emotional
disorders (Beck&Clark,1997;Heinrichs&Hofmann, 2001;Mathews
& MacLeod, 1994).
However, little is known about avoidance conditioning in rela
tion to social anxiety. In fact, little research on avoidance learning
has been conducted in humans. Nevertheless, new theories of
avoidance learning have been proposed recently that may be
crucial for our understanding of avoidance in SAD.
It is speculated that avoidance behavior can function as a nega
tive occasion setter (De Houwer, Crombez, & Baeyens, 2005),
because avoidance learning involves a so called ‘feature negative
discrimination’: the CS is followed by the US when feature X is
absent, whereas CS is not followed by the US when feature X is
present. Regarding this, the crucial points in studies on avoidance
learning are identical to those in studies on negative occasion
setting. The only difference is that feature X is a behavior in the
former and a second CS in the latter. Using a contingency judgment
experiment, De Houwer et al. (2005) showed that avoidance
behavior indeed shares several functional properties with a nega
tive occasion setter, such as the ability to modulate conditioned
responding to stimuli, resistance to counterconditioning and
selective transfer of modulation.
Another contemporary theory that also accounts for the actual
performance of the avoidance response is proposed by Lovibond
(2006). Using recent developments in conditioning research and
clinical psychology, Lovibond (2006) developed an integrated
expectancy based model. This model, intended to apply to human
avoidance learning, is based on Pavlovian conditioning, Instru
mental conditioning, propositional knowledge of learned contin
gencies and an interaction of avoidance and anxiety mediated by
expectancy of aversive outcome. This model is described as
a cognitive model of anxiety in which performance of an avoidance
response reduces expectancy of an aversive outcome and thereby
reduces anxiety. This cognitive expectancy model is supported by
evidence from a lab based paradigm of human avoidance learning
(Lovibond, Saunders, Weideman, & Mitchell, 2008). Although the
paradigm was successfully used to study the cognitive accounts of
avoidance, it has not been applied to study the relation with social
anxiety yet.
We used a modiﬁed version of the human avoidance learning
paradigm (Lovibond et al., 2008) to test the cognitive expectancy
account of avoidance in social anxiety. Following Lovibond and
colleagues, we measured change from baseline skin conductance
level (dSCL) as an autonomic measure of anxiety and on line
subjective expectancy of US (Lovibond, 1992). We adapted the
paradigm by using social CS and US, since the use of ecologically
more valid stimuli might enhance discrimination of HSA and LSA
(Lissek et al., 2007). In addition, we implemented a subsequent
extinction like procedure to the paradigm containing aspects of
exposure therapy with decreased safety behavior (Wells et al.,
1995): encounter a feared situation (CS associated with US) with
the believe that a feared outcome would occur (expectation of US),
while performance of safety behaviors (avoidance response) is
prohibited. Because avoidance was unavailable and the US was
absent in this procedure, participants would not attribute the
nonoccurrence of the feared outcome (no US) to the safety behavior
(avoidance response).
Allover, we expected that acquisition of the avoidance response
would reduce US expectancy that would lead to reduced anxiety
(Lovibond et al., 2008). For HSA we formulated three speciﬁc
hypotheses: First, based on the previously found expectancy bias in
social phobics (Hermann et al., 2002; Veit et al., 2002), we pre
dicted HSA to show an enhanced US expectancy compared to LSA in
the ﬁrst stage of avoidance learning, when the functionality of the
avoidance response still needs to be proven. Second, because
avoidance of (negative) social stimuli is a main feature of social
anxiety (e.g., Barlow, 2002; Clark & Wells, 1995), we predicted that
HSA would be faster in learning the effects of avoidance. Third,
based on previous ﬁndings on extinction (e.g., Hermann et al.,
2002), we predicted HSA to show delayed extinction (i.e., relatively
diminished decrease in US expectancy and dSCL compared to LSA)
during the extinction like procedure, in which the CS (initially
followed by US) was presented without the availability of avoid
ance response and the US. Similar hypotheses counted for the dSCL,
although discrimination in skin conductance measures has
frequently failed to be found in anxious participants (Del Ben et al.,
2001; Grillon & Ameli, 2001).
Methods
Participants
A total of 22 low socially anxious (LSA; 16 male; mean
age 21.55, SD 3.76) and 26 high socially anxious (HSA; 8 male;
mean age 19.42, SD 1.96) individuals participated in this
experiment for ﬁnancial reward or course credit. The participants
(all students of Leiden University) consecutively enrolled in this
study and group division was based on their score on the brief
version of the Fear of Negative Evaluation Scale (BFNE; Leary, 1983)
through median split procedure. The LSA (mean 1.55, SD 1.30)
differed signiﬁcantly from HSA (mean 18.08, SD 9.77) in mean
score on the BFNE (F(1, 46) 61.82, p < 0.001). Exclusion criteria
were: any psychiatric disorder on AXIS I, including substance abuse,
not corrected visual impairments, any clinical signiﬁcant physical
impairment or medical disease and use of medication.
Materials
The BFNE measures the degree to which apprehension at the
prospect of being negatively evaluated is experienced. Because of
better psychometric properties, 12 straightforwardly formulated
items were used instead of the original set of items containing four
reversed scored items (e.g., Carleton, McCreary, Norton, &
Asmundson, 2006). Respondents are required to rate the degree to
which each item ﬁts them on a ﬁve point scale (0 not at all, 1 a
little, 2 fairly, 3 good, 4 very good). The questionnaire showed
good internal consistency and construct validity (e.g., Collins,
Westra, Dozois, & Stewart, 2005).
Apparatus and stimuli
Two desktop computers were used for this experiment. The ﬁrst
computer presented the avoidance conditioning task and recorded
the participant’s responses using E Prime version 1.1 software. The
second computer registered the SCL throughout the experiment
with a sample rate of 500 samples/s using Acqknowledge software
(Biopac System Inc.). Measurements were acquired through
a Galvanic skin response ampliﬁer (GSR100C) and a Biopac data
acquisition system (mp150 Windows).
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Participants were tested singly in a dim lit room. The instructor
controlled the experiment from a separate room. The participant
and the instructor were able to communicate through an intercom.
Three different pictures of neutral male faces served as CSs and
were presented on a 17 inch color TFT computer screen approxi
mately 30 inch in front of the participant. The CSs were approxi
mately 5 inch  6 inch large and appeared in the center of the
screen in front of a black background. Instructions were given on
the same screen. On the table in front of the screen a response box
with four buttons and a mouse were situated. The four buttons
could illuminate individually. With themouse, participants gave US
expectancy ratings on each trial by moving the mouse cursor from
a ﬁxed starting point (left side top of the screen) to a visual
analogue scale (center of the screen), which appeared on the
screen. The scale represented the chance of the occurrence of an US
and ranged from 0 to 100 (0 no US, 100 deﬁnitely an US).
Participants wore headphones that played white noise at about
70 dB headphones during the experiment to increase arousal and
reduce habituation.
The stimuli in this experiment were socially relevant. CSs were 3
pictures of male faces with neutral expressions selected from the
Karolinska Directed Emotional Faces (Lundqvist, Flykt, & O¨hman,
1998). The US consisted of a combination of a critical vocalization
and an electric shock of 100 ms duration. The critical vocalization
consisted of a male voiced shout ‘Get lost!’ (‘Rot op!’ in Dutch) at
approximately 90 dB and was presented through headphones. The
electric shock was added to induce an additional shock effect and
to make the US more aversive. The shock electrodes were attached
to the thumb of the non dominant hand. Skin conductance was
measured through disposable electrodermal activity electrodes
(Biopac 100/PK EL507 10) attached to the second and third ﬁngers
of the non dominant hand.
Procedure
After arrival of the participant, the experimenter reminded that
the experiment involved delivery of loud noise and shouts and
administration of electric shocks and that theywould have the right
to terminate the experiment at any time. If participants agreed to
participate, they were asked to sign an informed consent.
Participants were instructed to wash their hands with soap and
water before ﬁtted with the electrodes. They were asked to
complete the BFNE. After completion of the questionnaire, they
were led through a work up procedure to select a ‘deﬁnitely
uncomfortable, but not painful shock level’. Shock levels were
limited to 1.0 and 5.0 mA to minimize group differences.
Prior to the conditioning task, the participants were asked to
read the instructions presented on the screen. Subsequently, the
experimenter gave a verbal explanation of the task. Participants
were told that on each successive trial a face as CS would appear for
5 s, followed by a 10 s delay, followed by either a critical vocaliza
tion and shock as US or no US. Theywere informed that one ormore
buttons on the response box might be lighted up during CS
presentation and they had to press a lit button, when this was the
case. Only one of the four buttons would prevent the US and it
would be the same button throughout the experiment. Participants
were instructed to give a rating during the 10 s delay after the CS
disappearance to indicate their US expectancy. This rating was
given by placing the mouse cursor on a visual analogue scale from
0 to 100 (0 no aversive stimuli expected, 100 aversive stimuli
expected) presented on the computer screen. Participants were
instructed to use their dominant hand for the responses and ratings
to avoid movement artifacts in the skin conductance measures.
The experimenter gave clear instructions, so that the partici
pants knew that theywere required to learn explicitly which face(s)
would lead to an US and which response button could cancel the
US. If the participants indicated that everything was clear, they
were asked to put on the headphones and the avoidance condi
tioning task was started. The design of the task is shown in Table 1
and outlined below. The three CSs, designated A to C, were allocated
to the three different neutral male faces. Since there were three
different faces, there were six different combinations of allocation
possible. This combination of allocation and the correct button was
randomly chosen for each participant. Within each phase, trial
order was random except that there were no more than two
consecutive presentations of the same stimulus type. The trial
procedure was as follows. Each trial started with a resting period
with a duration varying randomly between 25 s and 45 s with
a mean of 35 s. After this period, a CS would be presented. During
the CS presentation, two out of the four response buttons illumi
nated, except for in the Pavlovian phase. In avoidable trials, the
illuminated buttons always included the correct avoidance button,
whereas in unavoidable trials the correct avoidance button was
unavailable. When a lit button was pressed, the button lights went
off and the responsewas recorded. The CSwas always presented for
the full 5 s, so button presses did not terminate CS presentation.
After CS termination, during the 10 s delay, an instruction appeared
on the screen asking the participants to rate their US expectancy.
After the 10 s delay, the US would either occur or not. The design
per phase was as follows:
1. In the Pavlovian phase, all CSs were presented with A and B
followed by the US and C not followed by the US. No response
buttons illuminated in this phase. Thus, participants were not
required to make a button response in this phase.
2. In the Instrumental phase, there were six ‘avoidable’ A(þ) trials
on which A was presented with two response buttons illumi
nated (including the correct ‘avoidance’ button). If the partici
pant pressed the correct avoidance button, no US would be
presented; otherwise US would follow. In this phase, partici
pants also received two ‘unavoidable’ trials in which CSs (1 Aþ
trial and 1 Bþ trial) were presented with two response buttons
illuminated, without the correct avoidance button. Finally, the
participant also received two ‘safe’ C trials, in which C was
illuminated with two buttons, without correct avoidance
button, followed by no US.
3. In the Test phase, occurrence of transfer was tested: transfer of
the instrumental response on stimulus A to the other trained
predictor (B) of US. Both A and B were tested with the correct
avoidance button available (A(þ) and B(þ)) and with the
correct avoidance button unavailable (Aþ and Bþ) to test the
impact of avoidance availability on US expectancy and arousal.
Table 1
Design of experiment.
Phase
Pavlovian Instrumental Test Extinction
Aþ (2) A(þ) (6) Aþ (1) A (4)
Aþ (1) A(þ) (1)
Bþ (2) Bþ (1) Bþ (1) Bþ (2)
B(þ) (1)
C (4) C (2) C (1) C (2)
A CS1.
B CS2.
C CS3.
þ Aversive stimuli.
 No aversive stimuli.
(þ) Avoidable aversive stimuli.
(N) N trials (randomly presented with no more than two consecutive presenta-
tions of same stimulus type).
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Since the availability of the correct avoidance button in B(þ)
trials was required, new button combinations were also
introduced for Aþ, A(þ), Bþ and C trials in order to equate the
novelty.
4. During the Extinction phase the trained predictor, A, of a US was
presented without the US following (A ). In these trial types,
two response buttons other than the correct avoidance
response button were illuminated. Thus, the correct avoidance
button was unavailable. The participant also received
unavoidable Bþ trials and safe C trials.
All four phases followed each other without any indication
being given to participants that there would be any changes.
Data scoring and transformation
Following Lovibond et al. (2008), acquisition of the avoidance
response was deﬁned by a criterion of at least two consecutive
correct responses on the A(þ) trials during the acquisition phase.
The skin conductance measure was the change in mean skin
conductance level from the 5 s pre CS baseline period to the ﬁnal
5 s of the post CS delay period (dSCL). The ﬁnal 5 s of the post CS
delay period was found to be most sensitive for distinguishing
between various trial types (Lovibond et al., 2008). dSCL data was
log transformed as follows, log (post CS score þ 1) log (baseline
score þ 1) to minimize individual differences and normalize the
distribution. Expectancy ratings (0 100) from participants were
recorded by the computer.
Statistical analysis
For each phase, we performed repeated measures analysis of
variance (ANOVA) on both US expectancy ratings and dSCL, with
Group as between subjects factor and Stimulus type or Trial as
within subjects factor (Girden, 1992). We used the same a priori
contrasts (Difference and Polynomial) for US expectancy and dSCL
to examine within subjects, and within subjects by between
subjects interaction effects. First, we inspected the main effects of
the within subjects factors, to see whether we were successful in
replicating the results of Lovibond et al. (2008) by using a modiﬁed
version of their paradigm. Secondly, pertaining to our speciﬁc
hypotheses for HSA, we were interested in whether these effects
would differ between HSA and LSA showed by the interaction
effects. If an interaction effect was found, post hoc comparisons
were performed using Bonferroni correction to control for type
I errors. Additionally, we performed an ANOVA for the single Aþ
trial in the Instrumental phase, to test whether HSA and LSAwould
differ when the avoidance response became unavailable. All analy
ses were performed using SPSS for Windows, version 14.0.
Results
Avoidance acquisition and shock level
All 48 participants reached the criterion of two consecutive
correct avoidance responses during the Instrumental phase. For the
ﬁrst trial in the Instrumental phase, 2 of the LSA and 2 of the HSA
failed to press an illuminated button (all were on A(þ) trials). The
percentage of participants who made the correct response on each
of the 6 A(þ) trials was 59, 82, 96, 100, 100,100 for LSA, and, 62, 89,
96, 100, 100, 100 for HSA. The number of the A(þ) trials before
reaching the acquisition criterion did not differ between LSA
(mean 2.68, SD 0.89) and HSA (mean 2.42, SD 0.86;
F(1,46) 1.045, p 0.312).
The mean shock levels (mA) chosen did not differ between LSA
(mean 3.59, SD 1.76) and HSA (mean 2.96, SD 1.69;
F(1, 46) 1.59, p 0.213).
Expectancy ratings
The US expectancy data were combined across both groups, and
the mean US expectancy rating for each trial over all phases were
calculated. These mean US expectancy ratings in Fig. 1 show the
learning effects over time for all stimulus types. Overall, the US
expectancy ratings tracked the experimental contingencies. Fig. 2
displays the mean expectancy ratings only for stimulus type A for
each group separately. Differences in US expectancy ratings
between HSA and LSA were found in the Instrumental phase.
Pavlovian phase
To examine whether HSA and LSA differed in differentiation of
the threat stimuli (Aþ and Bþ) and the safe stimulus (C ),
subjective expectancies were averaged within this phase separately
for each stimulus type and entered in a Group (LSA, HSA)  Stim
ulus type (Aþ, Bþ vs. C ) ANOVA. A signiﬁcant main effect of
Stimulus type indicated clear discrimination between the threat
stimuli (Aþ and Bþ) and the safe stimulus (C ; F(1, 46) 269.62,
p < 0.001). To test whether HSA and LSA differed in acquisition of
the safe stimulus C across the four successive trials, a Group (LSA,
HSA)  Trial (1, 2, 3, 4) ANOVA was conducted. The expectancy
ratings decreased over trials (1 4) for C (F(3, 44) 53, 41,
p < 0.001; linear trend: F(1, 46) 147.81, p < 0.001). No
Group  Stimulus type and Group  Trial interaction effects were
found in this phase (all p > 0.5), indicating that HSA and LSA
learned the contingencies equally well.
Instrumental phase
To examine whether the previous acquired differentiation
between threat (Aþ, Bþ) and safe (C ) stimuli generalized to the
Instrumental phase, a Group (LSA, HSA) Stimulus type (Aþ, Bþ vs.
C ) ANOVA was performed. Only participants (LSA: N 19; HSA:
N 17) who experienced at least one correct avoidance response
on A(þ) trials, before exposed to Aþ and Bþ, were included in this
analysis to make sure that all participants in the analyses new that
‘absence of the possibility to press the avoidance button indicates
threat’. A signiﬁcant main effect of Stimulus type indicated the
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Fig. 1. Mean expectancy ratings for each trial over all phases. These mean expectancy
ratings were combined across both groups. The expectancy ratings reﬂect clear
learning effects over the phases. Note that the mean ratings on the Aþ and Bþ trials in
the Instrumental phase are only based on the data of the subjects who had experi-
enced one successful avoidance in the A(þ) trial previously. For the meaning of the
letters and symbols see footnote Table 1.
V. Ly, K. Roelofs / Behaviour Research and Therapy 47 (2009) 840–847 843
learned contingency from the Pavlovian phase (F(1, 34) 83.88,
p < 0.001). No Group  Stimulus type interaction effect was found
for this contrast (p 0.297).
To test whether HSA and LSA differed in avoidance acquisition
(A(þ) stimulus type) across the six successive trials, a Group (LSA,
HSA)  Trial (1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6) ANOVA was computed. A signiﬁcant
main effect for Trial indicated that the expectancy ratings declined
over the trials (1 6) for A(þ) to a very low level (F(5, 42) 76.87,
p < 0.001; linear trend: F(1, 46) 236.62, p < 0.001). Importantly,
there was a signiﬁcant Group  Trial interaction effect
(F(5,42) 2.582, p 0.040; linear trend: F(1,46) 6.137, p 0.017).
Post hoc comparisons of the two groups on mean expectancy
ratings using Bonferroni correction yielded a signiﬁcantly higher US
expectancy for the ﬁrst A(þ) trial in HSA (mean 82, SD 20)
compared to LSA (mean 64, SD 24; F(1, 46) 7.72,
p 0.0078 < 0.05/6). For the ﬁve subsequent trials, HSA did not
differ from LSA in US expectancy (p > 0.05/6). In fact, expectancy
ratings starting at Trial 4 remained at the same level in subsequent
trials for both HSA and LSA, suggesting a ﬂoor effect in learning.
Because the ﬁrst A(þ) trial was not always the ﬁrst trial in the
Instrumental phase for all participants, we conducted an additional
ANOVA comparing HSA and LSA on expectancy ratings for the ﬁrst
trial of the Instrumental phase to account for potential sequential
effects. The condition on this ﬁrst trial was the same for all
participants, because this trial always contained an A cue (A(þ) or
Aþ) and it was the ﬁrst opportunity to press a button. Thus, all
participants did not know which of the buttons the correct avoid
ance button was. Participants, who failed to press a button, were
excluded, because not pressing any buttonwould ‘deﬁnitely’ lead to
the US assuming the previously learned contingency (A US). Again,
HSA (N 24) showed higher US expectancy on this ﬁrst trial as
compared to LSA (N 22; F(1, 42) 6.879, p 0.012).
To explorewhether the opportunity to press a button in this ﬁrst
trial led to lower US expectancy compared to the US expectancy for
Aþ (no opportunity to press a button) at the end of the Pavlovian
phase, an ANOVA with Trial (last Aþ in Pavlovian vs. ﬁrst trial in
Instrumental) as within subjects factor was performed for both
HSA and LSA separately. Participants, who failed to press an illu
minated button were excluded: LSA (N 20) showed a lower US
expectancy in the ﬁrst trial in the Instrumental phase as compared
to the last Aþ trial in the Pavlovian phase (F(1, 19) 24.091,
p < 0.001), whereas the HSA (N 24) did not show this decrease
(p 0.301).
To investigate whether HSA and LSA showed differences in US
expectancy when the avoidance response became unavailable (the
single Aþ trial, the knowledge that ‘the avoidance response became
unavailable’ was crucial, in particular under conditions where US
threat was still present. Therefore, ﬁrst an ANOVA of the US
expectancy for the single Aþ trial was performed for those who
experienced one correct avoidance response on the A(þ) trial
before being exposed to the Aþ trial. This resulted in a trend
towards a higher US expectancy for HSA (N 17; mean 92,
SD 20) as compared to LSA (N 19; mean 77, SD 24;
F(1, 34) 4.030, p 0.053). Second and most critically, we con
ducted the same analysis for those, who had not only experienced
that the A(þ) trial could be successfully avoided, but also that threat
of US was still present (as evidenced by a Bþ trial): HSA now
showed a signiﬁcantly higher US expectancy for Aþ (N 11;
mean 94, SD 13) as compared to LSA (N 7; mean 73,
SD 27; F(1, 16) 5.043, p 0.039).
In sum, the results suggest that HSA and LSA learned the
avoidance response equally well. However, a higher US expectancy
in HSA as compared to LSAwas found for (1) the ﬁrst trial, in which
a response button was available, and (2) the trial in which the
correct avoidance response became unavailable for the ﬁrst time.
Test phase
In order for a learned avoidance response to transfer, we ﬁrst
tested whether the learned avoidance response was present in the
ﬁrst place. A Group (LSA, HSA)  Stimulus type (A(þ) vs. Aþ)
ANOVA revealed a signiﬁcant main effect for Stimulus type indi
cating a much lower US expectancy for A(þ) compared to Aþ (F(1,
46) 968.60, p< 0.001). To test the transfer of this effect of learned
avoidance from A(þ) to the B(þ) stimulus type, a Group (LSA,
HSA)  Stimulus type (B(þ) vs. Bþ) ANOVA was performed. A
signiﬁcant main effect for Stimulus type indicated lower US
expectancy for B(þ) compared to Bþ (F(1, 46) 321.78, p < 0.001).
Although Group (LSA, HSA)  Stimulus type (A(þ) vs. B(þ))
ANOVA showed that expectancy ratings on the B(þ) test trial were
not as low as for the trained A(þ) trial type (F(1, 46) 5.53,
p 0.023), a Group (LSA, HSA)  Stimulus type A (A(þ) vs.
Aþ)  Stimulus type B (B(þ) vs. Bþ) ANOVA showed that the
Stimulus type A Stimulus type B interaction comparing the size of
the Aþ vs. A(þ) difference with the Bþ vs. B(þ) difference was
nonsigniﬁcant (F(1, 46) 2.818, p 0.100), indicating successful
transfer of the avoidance response from stimulus A to B.
To test the discrimination between avoidable and unavoidable
trials in general, a Group (LSA, HSA) Stimulus type (the average of
US expectancy of (þ) vs. þ) ANOVA was conducted. As expected,
a signiﬁcant main effect for Stimulus type indicated the learned
effects of the avoidance response (F(1, 46) 911.07, p < 0.001). No
signiﬁcant Group  Stimulus type interaction effects were found
pertaining to all contrasts (all p > 0.5), indicating that transfer of
the learned avoidance response to stimulus B took place for
both HSA and LSA similarly. US expectancy for the safe stimulus
C remained very low for both groups.
Extinction phase
As for the Aþ trial in the Test phase, the expectancy rating for
the ﬁrst A trial in the Extinction phase started relatively high,
indicating the learned effects of the avoidance response. To
evaluate extinction, we calculated a Group (LSA, HSA)  Trial (1, 2,
3, 4) ANOVA. A signiﬁcant main effect for Trial revealed an
extinction process across the 4 trials (F(3, 44) 33.43, p < 0.001;
linear trend: F(1, 46) 73.28, p < 0.001), as the US expectancies
clearly declined over the A trials (1 4). We found a marginal
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Fig. 2. Mean expectancy ratings for stimulus A for LSA and HSA separately. The ﬁgure
shows differential US expectancy ratings for high and low socially anxious subjects in
the instrumental and extinction phase. Note that the mean rating for both the HSA and
LSA on the single Aþ trial in the Instrumental phase is only based on the data of the
subjects who had not only experienced one successful avoidance in the A(þ) trial, but
also that threat was still present as evidenced by a Bþ trial (for the meaning of the
letters and symbols see footnote Table 1).
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Group  Trial interaction effect (F(3, 44) 2.473, p 0.074)1. To
explore this marginal effect, comparisons of the mean expectancy
ratings of the two groups, showed higher US expectancy for the
third A trial in HSA (mean 74, SD 32) compared to LSA
(mean 48, SD 42; F(1, 46) 5.841, p 0.020). No differences
in US expectancy were found on the other 3 A trials between
HSA and LSA (all p > 0.5).
To test whether the acquired differentiation between Bþ and
C stimuli remained in the Extinction phase for both groups,
a Group (LSA, HSA)  Stimulus type (Bþ vs. C ) ANOVA was per
formed. The US expectancy remained signiﬁcantly higher for the
Bþ trials compared to the safe stimulus C (F(1, 46) 261.59,
p < 0.001). No Group  Stimulus type interaction effect was found
for this contrast (p > 0.5).
Skin conductance
First, HSA and LSA were compared on their baseline SCL (mean
SCL over 5 s pre CS baseline period), because higher baseline SCL
would make the change in SCL (dSCL) ‘look smaller’. There was no
signiﬁcant difference between the groups on baseline SCL (F(1,
46) 0.132, p 0.718). Subsequently, the same analyses for dSCL
were done as for US expectancy. We found a similar pattern of
learning effects for the Pavlovian, Instrumental and Test phases in
dSCL as in US expectancy, although no signiﬁcant group differ
ences were found. Large individual differences in skin conduc
tance, as well as habituation over trials could have attributed to
nonsigniﬁcant group differences (Bradley, Lang, & Cuthbert, 1993).
The changes in dSCL over all phases are displayed in Fig. 3 as was
done for US expectancy in Fig. 1. The dSCL for all stimulus type A
trials are shown for each group separately in Fig. 4.
Pavlovian phase
The dSCL to the threat stimuli (Aþ and Bþ) were higher than to
the safe stimulus C (F(1, 46) 8.71, p 0.005). The dSCL
decreased over trials (1 4) for C (F(3, 44) 4.16, p 0.011; linear
trend: F(1, 46) 8.89, p< 0.05). There was a trend towards a Group
(LSA, HSA)  Trial (1, 2, 3, 4) interaction (F(3, 44) 2.369,
p 0.083). To explore this marginal effect, comparisons of the two
groups on dSCL showed only a marginally higher dSCL on the ﬁrst
C trial for the HSA as compared to LSA (p 0.127).
Instrumental phase
The dSCL to the unavoidable trials (Aþ and Bþ) was higher than
to the safe trial C (F(1, 34) 7.682, p 0.009). For the ﬁrst A(þ)
trial, dSCL started high and decreased rapidly across the 6 training
trials (F(5, 42) 8.22, p < 0.001; linear trend: F(1, 46) 38.97,
p< 0.001). Therewere no signiﬁcant interaction effects (all p> 0.5).
ANOVA for the single Aþ trial for those, who experienced one
correct avoidance response on the A(þ) trial before exposed to the
Aþ trial, showed no difference in dSCL between HSA and LSA. The
same was found for the analysis on those, who had not only
experienced that the A(þ) trial could be successfully avoided, but
also that threat of US was still present as evidenced by a Bþ trial (all
p> 0.5). Remarkably, dSCL for the ﬁrst A(þ) trial and the Aþ trial in
this phase appeared relatively higher compared to all other trials of
the task.
Test phase
The learned avoidance response was clearly reﬂected by dSCL
(F(1, 46) 11.91, p 0.001). Transfer of the avoidance response
effect to stimulus B(þ) was also evident in the observed dSCL for
both HSA and LSA, with a much lower dSCL for B(þ) compared to
Bþ (F(1, 46) 7.97, p 0.007). No signiﬁcant difference in dSCL was
found for B(þ) compared to A(þ) (F(1, 46) 1.28, p 0.263). dSCL
was found to discriminate highly for the unavoidable trials (Aþ and
Bþ) and the avoidable trials (A(þ) and B(þ)) (F(1, 46) 16.00,
p< 0.001). Therewere no signiﬁcant interaction effects (all p> 0.5).
Extinction phase
There were no signiﬁcant main effects pertaining to Stimulus
type or Trial and no signiﬁcant Group  Stimulus type or
Group  Trial interaction effects (all p > 0.1). Noteworthy, dSCL for
all trials in this phasewere very low, presumably partly due to large
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Fig. 3. Log transformed differences of skin conductance levels from baseline (dSCL) for
each phase. The dSCL reﬂects clear learning effects over the ﬁrst three phases. Note
that the mean ratings on the Aþ and Bþ trials in the Instrumental phase are only based
on the data of the subjects who had experienced one successful avoidance in the A(þ)
trial previously (for the meaning of the letters and symbols see footnote Table 1).
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Fig. 4. Log transformed differences of skin conductance levels from baseline (dSCL) for
stimulus A for LSA and HSA separately. The ﬁgure shows that dSCL was especially high
for the ﬁrst A(þ) trial and the A trial in the Instrumental phase as these trials contained
novel aspects: illumination of buttons and unavailability of the correct avoidance
response button for A(þ) and Aþ respectively. Note that the Log dSCL for both the HSA
and LSA on the single Aþ trial in the Instrumental phase is only based on the data of
the subjects who had not only experienced one successful avoidance in the A(þ) trial,
but also that threat was still present as evidenced by a B trial (for the meaning of the
letters and symbols see footnote Table 1).
1 We performed a Group (LSA, HSA)  Order1 (ﬁrst Bþ)  Order2 (second
Bþ)  Trial (1, 2, 3, 4) ANOVA to test whether an order effect of Bþ could have
inﬂuenced the marginal effect. This revealed no signiﬁcant interaction effects of
Order 1 and Order 2 with Group and Trial (all p > 0.5), indicating that the sequence
effect of B trials did not inﬂuence our results.
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individual differences and habituation to the conditioning task
(Bradley et al., 1993).
Discussion
The current study has successfully replicated the major prem
ises of the Integrated expectancy based model by Lovibond et al.
(2008). We modiﬁed Lovibond’s avoidance conditioning paradigm
using social instead of non social stimuli for testing low (LSA) and
high socially anxious (HSA) individuals. Consistent with previous
ﬁndings, we found a decrease in US expectancy and dSCL during
avoidance learning and transfer of avoidance response in both LSA
and HSA. In addition and most crucial, our modiﬁed avoidance
paradigm successfully discriminated between LSA and HSA.
First, we found that US expectancy was greater in HSA as
compared to LSA for the ﬁrst trial, wherein a button response was
available (Instrumental phase). Crucially, LSA showed a marked
lower US expectancy in this trial as compared to the previous Aþ
trial in the Pavlovian phase (in which no button response was
available yet), whereas HSA did not. For this trial, participants did
not know which response allowed successful avoidance of the US.
Given that participants were informed that one out of the four
buttons was the correct avoidance button, the best available
contingency information would be: a smaller chance for the US to
occur after pressing any button (since there was a 0.25 chance of
hitting the correct button). From this perspective, it is remarkable
that HSA’s US expectancy for this trial remained equally high as in
the end of the Pavlovian phase. This ﬁnding is consistent with
evidence that cognitive interpretation bias (i.e., a more negative
interpretation of stimuli) in anxious individuals is maximal under
conditions of ambiguous threat (e.g., Chan & Lovibond, 1996). HSA
showed such cognitive bias, when a new situation (i.e., the avail
ability of a button response) created an ambiguous contingency.
This interpretation is consistent with theories proposing that
expectancies are based on (1) present available information, and (2)
prior beliefs (Alloy & Tabachnik, 1984; Chater & Oaksford, 2008). In
an ambiguous situation, people rely primarily on their own
expectations using generalized knowledge, thus resulting in
a maximal cognitive bias in anxious participants.
Although this ﬁnding may suggest a cognitive interpretation
bias in HSA, we cannot rule out that the group difference was
affected by a positive bias in the LSA. A positive bias in LSA is
particularly evident by our second ﬁnding. When the avoidance
button became unavailable in the Instrumental phase (Aþ), HSA
showed a marginally higher US expectancy as compared to LSA.
This difference between HSA and LSA became more pronounced
(and signiﬁcant) when participants not only had the knowledge
that ‘the avoidance response became unavailable’ (after the expe
rience of an avoidable A(þ) trial), but also when they had experi
enced that threat of US was still present as evidenced by a Bþ trial.
Interestingly, this result suggests a more accurate estimate of the
actual contingency in HSA than in LSA. Since the participants were
instructed that it is always the same response button that prevents
the US, individuals who experienced an avoidable A(þ) trial, would
logically have known that avoidance is impossible in an Aþ trial
(due to the acquired CS US contingency in the Pavlovian phase and
the unavailability of the correct response button), and therefore
would have expected the US. Lower estimations in LSA suggest
a positive bias: theymade amore positive interpretation (at least to
some extent) that the A cuewas no longer as dangerous. Our results
are consistent with notions by Taylor and Brown (1988), suggesting
that a positive bias can serve as a protection to the self esteem and
mental health, and that healthy individuals particularly show
positive biases in situations of perceived threat. Our data show that
HSA lack such positive bias, which is in line with literature
suggesting that social anxiety is associated with an absence of
positive thinking (e.g., Hirsch & Mathews, 2000). Such lack of
positive bias leads to vulnerability to development and mainte
nance of psychopathology (Taylor & Brown, 1988).
The fact that the subjective US expectancy for the Aþ trial in the
Test phase did not differ between LSA and HSA any more, suggests
that 1 Aþ trial (presented in the Instrumental phase) was needed to
‘convince’ the LSA about the effectiveness of the avoidance
response and that it is necessary to rely on the avoidance response
for not receiving the US. This result suggests that, compared to LSA,
a lack of positive bias in HSA may lead to higher susceptibility to
safety behavior interpretations. This ﬁnding is not only relevant for
the interpretation of the role of safety behaviors, it is also relevant
for learning theories supporting the role of avoidance conditioning
in social anxiety.
Finally, we investigated the relationship between social anxiety
and extinction like processes. Although previous research showed
that anxiety predicted delayed extinction (e.g., Hermann et al.,
2002), we only found a marginal effect for a delay in extinction in
HSA. This could be related to the use of a non clinical group of high
socially anxious participants. Another explanation is that our
designwas not a ‘regular’ CS alone extinction procedure, because it
included threatening Bþ trials and aspects of decreased safety
behavior.
Following Lovibond et al. (2008), we measured skin conduc
tance as an indicator for anxiety. Since expectancy has been shown
to be a mediator of anxiety (Lovibond et al., 2008), expectancy was
hypothesized to reﬂect the degree of anxiety. Although HSA and
LSA differed in expectancy ratings, we failed to ﬁnd any group
differences on dSCL. Skin conductance is a measure for autonomic
arousal (not anxiety per se) and is found particularly sensitive to
stimulus signiﬁcance and novelty (Bradley et al., 1993). The absence
of difference between HSA and LSA in dSCL for the ﬁrst trial for
which a button response was required, could be partly due to the
novelty of button illumination and the requirement to press
a button, that could have led to heightened skin conductance for
both HSA and LSA. A similar reason might account for the single Aþ
trial in the Instrumental phase. This trial likely elicited enhanced
skin conductance in both HSA and LSA because the avoidance
response became unavailable. This is supported by the elevated
dSCL for both the ﬁrst A(þ) trial and the Aþ trial in the Instrumental
phase compared to other trials in other phases (see Figs. 3, 4).
Future studies should use more valid and accurate measures of
anxiety, such as fear potentiated startle (Bradley et al., 1993).
To our knowledge, this is the ﬁrst study addressing avoidance
learning and cognitive expectancy in relation to social anxiety. We
replicated and extended the ﬁndings of Lovibond et al. (2008) by
showing that the avoidance learning paradigm using social stimuli
successfully differentiates high socially anxious from low socially
anxious individuals. It is important to note, that these ﬁndings
should be replicated using a priori selected groups and also
allowing studying sex differences.
Despite this limitation, the present ﬁndings stress the impor
tance to conduct further research on cognitive processes in social
anxiety that play a role in avoidance learning. Social avoidance is
the major maintaining factor in SAD. It prohibits exposure to social
situations and therewith extinction of the social fear. The present
ﬁndings concerning cognitive interpretation bias in HSA encour
ages research on directional relation of interpretation bias and
anxiety and the training of interpretation biases (Salemink, Van den
Hout, & Kindt, 2006, 2007). Future studies should explore whether
similar mechanisms may play part in other anxiety disorders, such
as post traumatic stress disorder or speciﬁc phobia. One thera
peutic implication of our ﬁndings is that cognitive and behavioral
treatments for anxiety might beneﬁt from not only including
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procedures aimed at altering negative beliefs, but also procedures
directed at the generation of positive inferences, especially under
conditions of high threat perception.
In conclusion, this study successfully replicated previous ﬁnd-
ings with a modiﬁed avoidance paradigm using social stimuli. The
paradigm also successfully differentiated between HSA and LSA.
First, HSA showed higher US expectancy than LSA when high
uncertainty about successful avoidance or ambiguity of a situation
was present. This suggests a cognitive interpretation bias in high
socially anxious individuals under the condition of ambiguous
threat. Second, when the avoidance response became unavailable,
LSA showed lower US expectancy than HSA, particularly under high
threat perception. This suggests a positive bias in low socially
anxious individuals. A lack of such positive bias in high socially
anxious individuals may lead to higher susceptibility to safety
behavior interpretations. Together, these ﬁndings support the role
of cognitive processes in avoidance conditioning and social anxiety
and underscore the relevance to encounter avoidance learning in
studying social anxiety.
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